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The financial crisis that began in summer 2007 has since turned into the worst economic crisis 
since the Great Depression. Its immediate causes are to be found in the malfunctioning of the 
financial sector: securitization of mortgages allowed for a fast growth of credit and lowered 
credit standards as banks  believed  they  had passed  on credit  risk; this fuelled a property 
bubble; statistical models, that turned out to be based on short time samples, were promised to 
reduce risk by constructing ingenious portfolios; well-paid rating agencies decorated the new 
assets with triple A ratings; banks shifted credit off balance sheets into structured investment 
vehicles; finally, capital inflows from Asian countries that wanted to accumulate reserves 
provided  ample  liquidity  for  this  process.  Obviously  the  financial  system  needs  to  be 
fundamentally overhauled. While these mechanisms were indeed important, this paper argues, 
they are only half of the picture. The focus on the flaws in the financial system may hide other 
causes of the crisis. The polarization in income distribution, in particular, tends to get glossed 
over as a potential cause of the crisis. This is not to deny the importance of financial factors. 
The crisis erupted as financial crisis for good reasons. The underlying accumulation regime 
had financial expansion as one of its key building blocks. However, what is at stake is more 
than financial system. This paper will thus argue that the present crisis should be understood 
as a crisis of neoliberalism. Financial deregulation is one of the components of neoliberalism, 
the polarization of income distribution is another one; it is their interaction that provided the 
grounds for the crisis. 
 
In a nutshell, our story is the following. Neoliberalism has led to a shift in power relations 
between  capital  and  labour.  As  a  consequence  income  distribution  has  shifted  sharply  in 
favour of capital. Economically this has a dampening effect on domestic demand (as demand 
is wage led in the world as whole) which provides the background in front of which the 
macroeconomic  imbalances  that  erupted  in  the  present  crisis  have  to  be  understood. 
Remarkably, increased profits have basically nowhere translated to an investment boom. The 
change  in  distribution  has  interacted  with  macroeconomic  changes  caused  by  financial 
deregulation,  or,  more broadly  speaking,  by  financialization.  Financial  deregulation  has a 
international as well as a domestic dimension. Deregulation of international capital flows has 
                                                
1 Some sections of this paper build closely on previous work by the author, in particular on Stockhammer (2008), 
Stockhammer and Ramskogler (2009), and Stockhammer (2010). 4 
allowed countries to temporarily sustain large current account deficits – as long as financial 
markets  were  willing  to  provide  the  corresponding  capital  inflows.  Indeed,  capital  flows 
rather than trade flows have become the prime determinant of exchange rate movements and 
for  many  countries,  boom-bust  cycles  driven  by  capital  inflows  and  consequent  abrupt 
outflows (and currency crises) have been the most important feature of the finance-dominated 
accumulation regime.  
 
As some countries have been able to run substantial current account surpluses (while others 
run  deficits)  international  financial  liberalization  has  created  a  new  scope  for  different 
trajectories across countries. In a first group of countries domestic financial deregulation has 
provided a key driving force of growth by giving households improved access to credit. This 
has – typically in conjunction with real estate bubbles – led to a credit-driven consumption 
growth. These credit-led economies have proven the main engine of growth by means of a 
consumption boom. They have also run substantial current account deficits. A second group 
of counties has relied on export-driven growth (and subdued domestic consumption) and run 
substantial current account surpluses. Two key sources of the crisis, debt-driven consumption 
and international imbalances are thus linked to the interactions of financial liberalization and 
the polarization of income distribution.
2  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
present  crisis  and  its  metamorphoses.  Section  3  discusses  neoliberalism  and  highlights 
different interpretations. Section 4 analyses changes in income distribution. Section 4 presents 
the characteristics of the finance-dominated accumulation regime, in particular its effects on 
investment, consumption and net exports and it highlights the emergences of two different 
growth models. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The crisis 2007-2010  
 
In  mid  2006  house  prices  in  the  USA  started  to  decline.  With  hindsight,  that  marks  the 
beginning of the crisis, even if it attracted little attention at the time. Rapidly rising house 
prices, and the mortgage lending that came with it, had been the basis of a boom driven by 
credit-financed consumption and construction investment in the USA. As will be discussed 
later, the structural causes of the crisis include the deregulation of the financial sector which 
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gave  rise  to  a  wave  of  financial  innovation,  i.e.  new  ways  of  creating  debt,  and  the 
polarization of  income distribution. It came  with international trade  imbalances and huge 
capital inflows to the USA. But this section will give a brief overview of the unfolding of the 
crisis itself. 
 
The crisis broke out in a seemingly obscure niche of the US financial system: the subprime 
market, that is the market on which derivatives on low-quality mortgage credit; thus the initial 
name of the crisis as subprime crisis. This is a rather small segment of the overall mortgage 
market, though it accounted for a substantial part of the growth in the years before the crisis. 
As subprime credit is, by definition, of low quality, it was the natural field for the kind of 
financial engineering, securitization, that was supposed to reduce risk. What was going on 
here was the extreme form of what happened on a much broader scale in the entire mortgage 
industry. In August 2007 the crisis spilt over into the interbank market, where banks lend to 
each other, usually very short term. The interbank market is at the very centre of the modern 
financial system. Interest rose to more than one percentage points above that on government 
bonds. This increase in the risk premium of lending meant that banks did not trust each other. 
And rightly so, as it turned out. Central banks reacted quickly and pumped billions (of dollars 
and euros) into the market to maintain liquidity. 
 
However, while things stabilized the crisis evolved. In spring 2008 Bear Stearns, one of the 
leading investment banks, was bankrupt and could only be sold with the FED guaranteeing 
some 20 bio US$ worth of assets. A first (small) fiscal stimulus packet was implemented in 
the  USA,  but  the  impact  on  the  real  economy  outside  the  USA  was  limited.  In 
August/September 2008 the crisis turned into a full scale financial crisis – and it did so with a 
big bang: Lehman Brothers, one of Wall Street’s leading investment banks, went bankrupt. 
The end of the world (or at least of big finance) as we knew it, seemed to have arrived. 
Interest rates soared (interest spread rose to several percentage points) and liquidity froze.  
 
Again  economic  policy  reacted.  The  principles of  neoliberal  free-market  economics  were 
suspended  for  a  few  weeks.  Central  banks  provided  more  liquidity,  but  that  proved 
insufficient to stabilize markets. Governments had to intervene directly: AIG, an insurance 
firm that had insured huge volumes of credit derivates, was taken over by the state as were 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two state-sponsored mortgage refinancing giants. Within a 
few  weeks the  recapitalization financial  institutions  and  massive  guarantees  for  interbank 6 
credits  became  mainstream  economic  policy.  Recapitalization  meant  that  governments 
effectively were nationalized (fully or partly) financial institutions – but contrary to private 
shareholders they were eager to abstain from interfering with management priorities. In late 
October  2008  a  EU  summit  issued  a  statement  that  no  systemically  important  financial 
institutions would be allowed to fail – a capitalism without bankruptcies was declared! 
 
By fall 2008 the financial crisis had turned into a full blown economic crisis. Income in most 
developed countries shrank at a speed not seen since the 1930s (in most countries by around 
5%). And it not only  hit  those countries  that had experienced  property bubbles, but also 
countries like Germany and Japan (where property prices had been practically flat) and it 
spread to the emerging countries. Eastern European countries were particularly bad hit, with 
the Baltic countries suffering GDP declines by around 20%. The IMF had to be called in to 
save  Hungary,  Pakistan  and  the  Baltic  states.  But  the  most  conspicuous  symbol  of  the 
downturn was certainly the fall of GM: once the world’s largest firm and employer, it now 
had to rescued by the state.  
 
While complete meltdown seemed imminent in fall 2008, in the course of spring 2009 it 
became clear that the – historically unprecedented – scale of government intervention had 
prevented outright collapse. A cascade of bank breakdowns could be prevented by rescue 
packages that amounted to 80% of GDP in the USA and the UK (UNCTAD 2009, Table 1.8) 
and by the FED expanding its balance sheet by a trillion US$, mostly by acquiring assets that 
it  would  not  have  touched  in  normal  times.  Risk  premia  remained  elevated,  banks  were 
making phenomenal losses, unemployment started rising, but normality of a sort returned. 
And, apparently, the pressure to reform the system had receded. Earlier declarations of a 
fundamental restructuring of the financial system had been forgotten and the debate on reform 
turned  into  specialists’ debate  into  technicalities,  with all  but private bankers  and central 
bankers being excluded from the decision making circles. The arrogance of the financial elite, 
however, is best captured by the debate on banker management’s pay. Despite the obvious 
disaster in finance, its leaders wanted to cash in again.  
 
But the normality that was about to restore itself was not quite the normality of before the 
crisis. After all, the crisis was by no means over. Indeed, for large parts of the population, it 
only had begun, when for the bankers it was almost over. Production fell and unemployment 
rose. In the USA foreclosures were rising. People lost their jobs and their homes. And there 7 
was another devastating effect of the crisis: budget deficits were increasing, surpassing 10% 
of GDP in many cases. So in the course of 2009 the crisis thus took its next turn: a fiscal 
crisis. This has been lingering for several months and had already erupted in central and 
eastern European countries, but its most prominent victim in winter 2009/10 was Greece and 
with it the Euro system.  
 
In January/February 2010  Greece faced punitive interest rates on  its (public)  debt  issues. 
Greece had fudged public debt statistics (with the help of leading Wall Street banks) and now 
had  difficulties  refinancing  its  debt.  But  Greece  was  not  alone,  the  other  Mediterranean 
members  of  the  Euro  area  faced  similar  problems.  Indeed,  what  had  been  exposed  was 
fundamental flaw in the construction of the Euro system. With exchange rates frozen, the 
southern countries had, despite much lower inflation since adopting the Euro, slowly, but 
steadily  by  lost  competitiveness  to  Germany  and  its  economic  satellites.  Germany’s  net 
exports  (mostly  to  other  Euro  countries)  amounted  to  more  than  5%  of  GDP.  This  was 
achieved by ruthless wage suppression and, consequently, low inflation rates (Lapavitsas et al 
2010). The Euro area had no instruments to deal with internal imbalances, other than trusting 
labour market flexibility to adjust the price levels. The other EU countries vaguely promised 
support and asked specifically for austerity.  
 
The Greek problem was the tip of an iceberg in another sense as well. Most countries now 
face sharply increasing levels of government debt due to the crisis and it is not clear when and 
how the fiscal could be solved. The budget cuts that are envisioned in many countries will 
imply a cut back in welfare states, a paradoxical outcome for what started as a speculative 
financial crisis has ended up as a crisis of the welfare state. After the banks have been saved, 
it is the lower classes that are asked to pay the bill of the crisis. 
 
3. Neoliberalism  
 
The decades after the Second World War were characterized by what has been called the 
Fordist accumulation regime, which was based on a social-Keynesian mode of regulation.
3 
                                                
3 Regulation theory regards the macroeconomic dynamic (described as the “accumulation regime”) as embedded 
in a particular institutional setting (the “mode of regulation”). While there is an agreement that the Fordist 
accumulation regime has come to an end in the course of the 1970s, there is no agreement on how to characterize 
the post-Fordist regime. Classical works of the (French) Regulation Theory include Aglietta (1979), Lipietz 
(1985) and Boyer (1990). Similarities between the Regulation Theory and the (American) Social Structures of 
Accumulation approach (Gordon, Edwards and Reich 1982, Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf 1983) are now 8 
Partly in response to the Great Depression, partly in response to the rise of socialist labour 
movements, governments assumed an active role in managing the economy, the welfare state 
was expanded and the financial system regulated. Full employment was a policy goal and, in 
many  cases,  was  approximately  achieved.  As  a  result,  capitalism  experienced  what  has 
sometime been called a ‘golden age’ of prosperity – and this prosperity was widely shared. 
Wages grew in line with productivity and income distribution was relatively even. Fordism 
was as a accumulation regime characterized by mass production and mass consumption. 
 
Fordism came into crisis in the course of the 1970s. While the debate on its deeper causes is 
still going on, its symptoms were clear: waves of labour unrest, a (by today’s standards: mild) 
recession,  rising  inflation  and  rising  unemployment.  Roughly  from  the  mid  1970s  trend 
productivity growth was substantially lower than before. Economic growth rates should not 
recover to the golden-age rates and, in particular in Europe, unemployment would remain 
elevated thereafter. Whatever the reasons, with hindsight it is clear that the late 1970s/early 
1980s mark watershed, the switch to neoliberalism. Neoliberalism began with the change in 
monetary policy and a sharp increase in interest rates, but it ushered in a much broader change 
in government priorities: a return to orthodox economic policies that regards low inflation and 
balanced budget as the key policy goals and, claiming that government could do nothing to 
lower structural unemployment, effectively accepted high unemployment rates. 
 
Neoliberalism turned into a full mode of regulation in the course of the next two decades.
4 It 
was characterized by a retreat of labour, deregulation of the financial sector and globalization. 
In the Anglo-Saxon countries neoliberalism came with an outright attack on organized labour. 
The miners’ strike in Great Britain and the air traffic controller strike in the USA marked 
bitter  defeats  for  labour.  In  continental  Europe  the  organisational  strength  of  labour  was 
eroded by two decades of high unemployment, welfare state retrenchment and globalization. 
The effects of this in income distribution will be discussed in the next section.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
widely recognized (e.g. McDonough and Nardone 2006). The question how national accumulation regimes 
interact has received limited attention within the regulationist approach. Becker (2002) and Becker and Blaas 
(2007) highlight differences along the axes of ‘intraverted’ versus ‘extraverted’ accumulation and ‘productive’ 
versus ‘fictitious’ accumulation. 
4 This, of course, is the author’s interpretation. The label neoliberalism is used to highlight that a mode of 
regulation is ultimately a political project. It is the outcome and institutionalization of various compromises and 
(in their intention often provisional) arrangements that acquire a certain degree of coherence. Within the 
framework of regulation theory the mode of regulation is comprise of the wage-labour relation, the forms of 
competition, the monetary regime, the forms of state intervention and the insertion into the international regime. 
This paper only sketches the changes in these area, but clearly falls short of an exhaustive analysis. 9 
Financial deregulation has two dimensions: liberalization of international capital flows and 
the  deregulation  of  domestic  financial  systems.  This  led  to  fundamental  changes  in  the 
financial landscape. At the international level capital flows were liberalized. Domestically 
changes  in  the  financial  framework  gave  rise  to  a  rapid  pace  of  financial  innovation, 
eventually increasing the scope for speculation. Both developments strengthened the influence 
of the financial sector. Real interest rates rose well above the growth  rates of real GDP. 
Financial  ratios  such  as  stock  market  capitalization,  derivatives  turnover  or  cross-border 
lending  soared.  Overall  the  income  shares  of  financial  capital  increased  considerably 
(Duménil and Lévy 2001, Power et al 2003). Moreover, the influence of financial investors on 
non-financial businesses has increased substantially under the so called shareholder  value 
revolution (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). These structural changes have been summarily 
called financialization and will play a key role in our analysis of the structure of accumulation 
(section 5). Globalization is a forth characteristic of the neoliberal mode of regulation. Its 
financial  dimension,  the  liberalization  of  international  capital  flows,  has  already  been 
mentioned. This was complemented by a free trade regime.  
 
In continental Europe neoliberalism came, at least as far as economic policy is concerned, 
often  in  the  guise  of  European  integration  and  EU  policies.  In  particular  the  free  trade 
agreements of the Single European Act, competition policy, and, later the services directive 
reflect  the  liberal  creed.  The  Maastricht  Treaty  and  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  were 
combined  an  anti-inflation  priority  with  a  restriction  on  fiscal  policy  without  offering 
adjustment mechanisms for the imbalances that it gave rise to (see section 5.3). 
 
The financial and economic crisis that began in 2007 has been a forceful reminder that free 
markets  come  with  violent  boom-bust  cycles.  By  historical  standards,  government 
intervention has been relatively quick and extensive. This may suggest that neoliberalism has 
been  abandoned.  Such  a  conclusion  interprets  neoliberalism  essentially  as  a  laissez-faire 
program,  a  political  project,  which  wants  to  do  away  with  state  regulation  and  state 
intervention. While this is certainly a tempting interpretation, and indeed warranted by some 
of the neoliberal rethoric, there are other interpretations as well. Harvey highlights a tension 
in neoliberalism: „We can (…) interpret neoliberalization either as a utopian project to realize 
a theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a political project 
to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic 
elites“ (Harvey 203, 19). Indeed, neoliberalism a project to restore class power is a hallmark 10 
of the Marxist interpretation of neoliberalism (e.g. Duménil und Lévy 2001, 2004). In this 
approach  the  anti-etatism  of  neoliberalism  is  instrumentalist,  but  not  essential.  It  will  be 
pursued when conducive to profitability, but not as an end in itself. 
 
Already  in the late 1970s Michel Foucault  (2007) had suggested a  third  interpretation  of 
neoliberalism,  which  we  might  call  neoliberalism  as  form  of  governance  by  competitive 
subjectification. Based on a careful reading of the German ordo-liberal school and the US-
American Chicago School Foucault argues that neoliberalism differs radically from classical 
liberalism  in  that  it  does  not  aim  at  liberating  markets,  but  at  creating  markets  and 
subordinating government activity under this goal. Markets don’t create themselves, if left on 
their  own,  but  have  to  be  constructed  and  maintained.  Contrary  to  classical  liberalism 
neoliberalism  thus  requires  permanent  and  profound  state  intervention.  Stockhammer  and 
Ramskogler (2009) reach a similar conclusion based on an analysis of recent economic policy 
and (‘New Keynesian’ and Neo-Institutionalist) developments in mainstream economics and 
call  these  developments  ‘enlightened  neoliberalism’.  The  title  of  the  2002  World 
Development report encapsulates this approach: Creating Institutions for Markets. As in the 
Marxist interpretation, state interventions do not constitute a break with neoliberalism. 
 
Our approach in the following is cast in a regulationist framework
5 and a adopts a pragmatic 
concept of neoliberalism that points out that it came with changes in income distribution and a 
deregulation of the financial sector. This is hardly a deep analysis of neoliberalism, but it 
suffices the purpose of this paper, namely to highlight that several constituent components of 
neoliberalism are closely involved in the mechanisms generating the crisis.  
 
4. Changes in income distribution 
 
One of the hall marks of neoliberalism has been the polarization of the distribution of income. 
The shift in power from labour to capital is clearly reflected in wage developments. Wage 
shares have been falling across Europe and in Japan and, to a lesser extent, in the USA and 
                                                
5 I am purposefully using the term regulationist ‘framework’ rather than regulationist ‘theory’ as the Regulation 
School, in my view, does not qualify as theory in the strong sense of the words, i.e. as positing specific causal 
relations that would explain a wide range of social (or economic) phenomena. Rather I regard it as a 
‘intermediate theory’ that offers a platform to analyze historically specific eras by encompassing socio-
institutional as well as economic aspects and allows potentially for the (historically specific) integration of 
(among others) Keynesian and Marxian arguments, as attempted in this paper. The theoretical scope of 
Regulation Theory, in this view, is limited; its practical usefulness, however, has been undervalued since its 
boom in the 1980s. In particular it is a pity that the analysis of power championed by the Social Structures of 
Accumulation approach, a close relative of the Regulation Theory has not inspired a broader research agenda. 11 
the UK (see Figure 1). The Anglo-Saxon countries have, however, witnessed a strong increase 
of inequality in personal income distribution (Figure 2). Arguably, the exorbitant management 
salaries  in the  Anglo-Saxon  countries should  be  considered  a form  of profits  rather  than 
wages. Indeed, subtracting the top 1% of wage earners from the US wage share, a strong 
decline can be observed. Based (CPI-adjusted) data available from OECD (2008), median 
weekly wages in the USA have grown by a mere 2.8% from 1980 to 2005, the bottom quartile 





Recently,  mainstream  economic  policy  institutions  have  shown  a  renewed  interest  in  the 
determinants of functional income distribution. IMF (2007a) and EC (2007) conclude that 
technological  change has been the main cause of  the decline in the wage  share and  that 
globalization  has  been  a  secondary  cause.  In  a  panel  analysis  for  OECD  countries 
Stockhammer (2009) shows that the findings of these studies regarding technological change 
are not robust and that financial globalization, trade globalization and the decline in union 
density  have  been  the  main  forces  behind  the  falling  wage  share.  The  influence  of 
globalization  (of  trade  and  production)  and  have  been  demonstrated  in  the  mainstream 
literature (e.g. IMF 2007) as well as in the heterodox literature (e.g. Milberg and Winkler 
2009 for the USA). ILO (2008) argues that financial globalization has contributed to the 
decline in the wage share, but does not provide econometric evidence. Rodrik (1998) and 
Harrison (2002) have included measures of capital controls and capital mobility. Remarkably, 
IMF (2007b) in a study on personal income distribution within countries finds that increases 
in foreign direct investment increases inequality.
6 Onaran (2009) shows that financial crisis 
have long-lasting distributional effects for several developing countries. 
 
What are the likely macroeconomic effects of this redistribution on aggregate demand? From 
a Kaleckian point of view, one would expect a dampening effect on aggregate demand. As 
wage  incomes  are  typically  associated  with  higher  consumption  propensities  than  profit 
incomes, this ought to lead to a decrease in the consumption share. Stockhammer et al. (2009) 
                                                
6 FDI flows illustrate the difficulties in distinguishing between financial globalization and globalization in 
production.  12 
find a saving  differential of around 0.4  for the Euro  area.
7 Given that wage shares have 
declined by some 10 %-points since 1980, consumption shares ought to have declined by 
some  4%  points  (of  GDP)  over  this  period  due  to  changes  in  income  distribution.  The 
background  for  macroeconomic  developments  in  the  neoliberal  era  is  one  of  potentially 
stagnant demand.  
 
5. The finance-dominated accumulation regime  
 
Stockhammer (2008) suggests that since the early 1980 a neoliberal mode of regulation has 
emerged that is complemented by a finance-dominated accumulation regime. This section will 
explore the characteristics of the latter. The analysis of the macroeconomic structure will be 
guided by the standard Keynesian expenditure function. Aggregate expenditures consist of 
private consumption, investment, net exports, and government expenditures. Each of these 
components will be investigated to analyze whether changes that can plausibly be linked to 




Given the rise in the profits, one might expect a dynamic growth of investment expenditures. 
However, this in what has happened. The disappointing performance of investment becomes 
most evident, when compared to profits (Figure 3). The decline in the investment-to-profits 
ratio can be observed in all major economies, even if the peak values differ across countries 
(the mean peaks in 1980). Financialization brought about several changes that potentially 
affect business investment (that is physical investment by firms). Admittedly, however, it has 
been  hard  to  pin  down  these  effects  as  business  investment  has  always  been  the 
macroeconomic variable that is hardest to explain for economists. One of the most important 
changes in investment behaviour is due to the increased role of shareholders. Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan (2000) argue that a shift in management behaviour from ‘retain and reinvest’ to 
‘downsize and distribute’ has occurred. More formally, Stockhammer (2004) shows that an 
increase in shareholder power will modify the desired profit-growth frontier for the firm. His 
estimation results suggest that financialization may explain a substantial part of the slowdown 
in accumulation. However, results vary widely across countries (strong effects in the USA and 
France, weak effects in Germany). Orhangazi (2008) finds evidence for this channel based on 
                                                
7 This value is in line with comparable studies for other groups of countries (Naastepad and Storm 2006/07, Hein 
and Vogel 2008).  13 
firm-level data for the USA. As the measure of operating surplus used in Figure 3 (as well as 
in the National Accounts) is a broad one that consists basically of all non-wage incomes, part 
of the reason for the declining trend in the investment operating surplus ratio is due to a 
change in  the composition of the operating surplus.  Interest and dividend payments have 
increased (Duménil and Lévy 2001, Crotty 2003). However only for few countries, namely 
for the USA, is data readily available. Onaran et al (2009) present econometric evidence for 
the negative effect of dividend and interest payments on investment. 
 
Figure 3  
 
A second change for investment behaviour has been in the economic environment that firms 
face. Volatility on financial markets has increased substantially in the course of financial 
deregulation. As a consequence firms face a higher degree of uncertainty which may make 
physical investment projects less attractive. In particular volatility of exchange rates seems to 
have had some effects on manufacturing investment. However, uncertainty is hard to measure 
and estimation results from the existing literature are not conclusive enough to suggest a clear 
order of magnitude of the effect (Carruth et al 2000, Stockhammer and Grafl 2008). 
 
Overall financialization has had a dampening effect on business investment, probably due to 
negative effects of shareholder value orientation and increased uncertainty. Notably, there has 
been no renewed interest in the effect of share prices on business investment (quite in contrast 
to  the  research  on  consumption  expenditures  and  share  prices).  As  in  the  early  1990s 
(Chirinko 1993, Ford and Poret 1992), most empirical economists would probably agree that 
share prices have little, if any, effect on investment. Nor is there much evidence that other 
than  in  Ireland  (and  maybe  in  the  Netherlands)  residential  investment  has  been  strongly 
affected by rising household debt levels.  
 
5.2 Consumption expenditures 
 
There  are  two  conflicting  effects  on  consumption  expenditures.  First  the  deterioration  of 
income  distribution  puts  a  downward  pressure  on  consumption,  because  working  class 
households  have  a  higher  consumption  propensity  than  earners  of  capital  income.  The 
background  for  macroeconomic  developments  is  one  of  potentially  stagnant  consumption 14 
demand.  Second,  financialization  has  increased  the  access  of  households  to  credit.  In 
combination with real estate booms this has often led to credit-financed consumption booms. 
 
In the USA consumption expenditures have become the main driving force in GDP growth in 
the 1990s. Indeed, the consumption share in GDP had been increasing since about 1980 (see 
Figure  4).  The  trend  is  similar  in  the  UK,  but  opposite  in  Germany  and  France.  There 
consumption  ratios  have  declined  since  1980.  There  has  been  a  remarkable  divergence 
between  countries.  Mainstream  economists  try  to  explain  this  increase  in  consumption 
assuming rational behaviour (in Anglo-Saxon countries). The falling saving rates were first 
explained by a wealth effect due to the rise in the value of financial assets because of the 
stock market boom.
8 In the late 1990s a 5% marginal propensity to consume out of financial 
wealth was often quoted (with some more qualification for European countries; e.g. Boone et 
al.  1998).  The  stock  market  crash  in  2000,  however,  did  not  result  in  a  slowdown  in 
consumption growth. The unabated consumption boom in the USA was then explained by 
booming  house  prices.  Residential  property  was  now  identified  as  the  key  source  of  the 
wealth effect  as is more frequently  accepted as collateral.  Case et al (2001), Catte  et  al. 
(2004), and Girouard et al. (2006) find substantially higher marginal propensity to consume 
out of property wealth than out of financial assets.
9  
 
Figure 4  
 
More generally speaking, financialization has given households more access to credit. Access 
to credit, of course, is not restricted to mortgages, but also includes other forms of consumer 
credit, credit cards and overdraft bank accounts. One of the key disagreements between the 
mainstream  economics  and  heterodox  approaches  is  the  question  whether  people  behave 
rationally. Much of the mainstream literature assumes that households rationally increased 
their debt ratios as their wealth increased. From a heterodox point of view a substantial part of 
the  accumulated  debt  is  due  to  households  maintaining  consumption  levels  that  are 
unsustainable (and thus could be considered irrational). As wages have stagnated in many 
                                                
8 Brenner (2003, 191) argues that most of the fall in the savings rate (in the late 1990s) occurred in the top 
income groups, who also benefited most from the increase in financial wealth. This, admittedly, fits uneasily 
with the argument made here. Evidence for the early 2000s, however, suggests that the debt burden has grown 
fastest for middle class households (which is in line with our argument) (State of Working America 2006/2007). 
This issue requires further research. 
9 While there is substantial evidence for the USA (albeit based on a short period of observations!) to back up this 
story, the evidence on European economies was always much thinner. Typically the wealth effects estimated for 
European economies were not statistically significant and/or much smaller. 15 
countries consumption norms as represented in mass media have arguably increased, many 
households  could  have  been  driven  into  debt  (Cynamon  and  Fazzari  2009).  From  this 
perspective it is misleading to speak of wealth effect, it should rather be a credit access effect. 
Either way, in the USA, the UK, Ireland and Spain property bubbles were accompanied by 
strong increases in household debt ratios. 
 
Household debt is difficult to measure and international comparisons chronically suffer from 
deficiencies in comparability of data due to different financial institutions and practices in 
different  countries.  Girourard  et  al.  (2006)  report  a  wide  variation  in  household  debt-to-
income rations. European countries display a wide range of debt to income ratios. However 
all European countries (for which data is available) have experienced rising debt ratios since 
1995. Notably the (unweighted) average of the debt ratios of the European countries is similar 
to the USA.  
 
OECD  data  also  show  that  (household)  savings  rates  are  falling  throughout  the  OECD 
countries, with the most pronounced fall occurring in the USA. Surprisingly, however, it turns 
out  that  this  is  not  mirrored  in  the  consumption  data.  While  the  USA  (and  Japan)  have 
experienced a  substantial  and  consistent  increase  of  consumption compared  to  disposable 
income since the mid 1980s, the same is not true in Europe. In most countries, notably France 
and Germany, the changes in the consumption share are in the order of magnitude that are 
within the range of a business cycle. There was a strong increase in Greece and a strong 
decrease in Ireland. The (unweighted) average of the EU15 is unambiguously flat with no 
change in the consumption ratio of economic significance (Stockhammer 2008).  
 
Overall, there is clear evidence for consumption as the driving force of growth only for few 
countries. The USA appears as the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, while household 
debt clearly increased in all countries, it did so to very different degrees, with the Anglo-
Saxon countries (as well as Denmark and the Netherlands) showing the largest increases. 
European countries experienced a sharp decline in wage shares, which should translate into 
falling  consumption  If  so,  increased  debt  may  have  compensated  this  decline  even  in 
continental Europe.
10 
                                                
10 There is an additional channel through which financialization may have affected consumption expenditures. In 
many countries the pay-as-you-go pension systems are being reformed or have been questioned. Typically some 
version of a capital-based system is envisioned in which households have to invest their savings (usually via 
funds) in the stock market. This should lead to an increase in savings as households have to put more aside for 
retirement. I am not aware that this channel has been investigated empirically.  16 
 
5.3 Net exports and capital flows 
 
Over longer periods net exports ought to be balanced. However, financial liberalization and 
globalization have allowed countries to sustain current account deficits at higher levels and 
for longer periods than previously. The flip side of the current account is net capital flows. 
(abstracting from changes in Central Bank reserves) net exports have to equal (net) capital 
outflows. Inversely, a current account deficit corresponds to capital inflows. Financialization 
has thus allowed countries to run larger current account deficits, provided that they can attract 
the corresponding capital inflows. Figure 5 plots the standard deviation of the current account 
as a ratio to GDP (for OECD countries) as a measure of international imbalances. This shows 
that international imbalances have increased substantially since the mid 1980s.
11 Tow things 
are remarkable about Figure 5. First, imbalances in the early 2000s were above the levels of 
the mid 1970s when the oil price shock gave rise to strong changes in current accounts across 
many countries; second the rise in international imbalance has been gradually building up 




The imbalances in international trade have also played an important role as a precondition in 
the building up of the bubble in the USA. The corresponding capital flows have provided vast 
amounts of capital in search of yield in US$ assets. These they found in various derivatives 
based on mortgage and commercial credit, thereby fuelling the credit-financed consumption 
boom. Without capital inflows the bubble in the USA would probably not have inflated as 
much as it did. 
 
Financial liberalization and globalization have, ironically, increased the potential for different 
developments across countries – if only as long as international financial markets remain 
calm. However, the capital flows that underlie the trade imbalances may abruptly halt or 
reverse and thereby cause severe crisis. The macroeconomic dangers of volatile capital flows 
have so far been felt most acutely in emerging economies. Mexico 1994, Turkey 1994 and 
2001, several countries in the course of the South East Asian crisis 1997/98, and Argentina 
                                                
11 As our measure only includes OECD countries China as well as some other South-East Asian countries that 
run substantial current account surpluses are not included. Our measure thus underestimates the full extent of 
international imbalances.  17 
2001 are all examples of such crises related to capital flows. All of them have led to severe 
recessions (at times with double digit declines in real GDP), some of them long-lasting, others 
more  short-lived.
12  However,  the  EMS  crisis  1992/93  also  shook  developed  economies 
(although  the  exchange  rate  devaluations  were  not  as  strong,  nor  were  the  following 
recessions). 
 
The  reason  why  changes  in  the  exchange  rate  have  such  a  devastating  effect  is  that  in 
liberalized international markets it is usually profitable to engage in interest arbitrage, that is 
borrow in one currency and invest or lend in another (often called carry trade). If, say, interest 
rates in Turkish Lira are higher than those in Euros (with exchange rates expected to be 
stable), it is tempting to take out a euro credit and lend in Turkish lira. By implication, assets 
and liabilities will then be denominated in different currencies (a related risk is that of the 
maturity of assets). Abrupt exchange rate realignments may then have disastrous effects on 
firms’ or banks’ balance sheets.   
 
International exchange rate arrangements seem key to understanding the accumulation and 
growth  dynamics  in  the  finance-dominated  accumulation  regime.  For  Europe,  the  most 
important institutional change in this area of course was the EMS (which effectively ended 
with the 1992/93 crisis) and European Monetary Unification. The introduction of the Euro 
was a reaction to the EMS crisis, where several countries had to devalue their currencies by 
some 20% (vis à vis the Deutsch Mark). At first, the Euro appears to have been a success. Not 
only  was  the  new  currency  accepted  by  the  public,  but  the  Euro  system  also  eliminated 
(nominal) exchange rate fluctuations and thereby the possibility of exchange rate crises. It 
also  substantially  decreased  inflation  and  (real)  interest  rates  in  the  former  soft-currency 
countries. However, since inflation differentials persist across European countries, there have 
been creeping changes in real exchange rates that have accumulated over the years. Real 
exchange rates have diverged since the introduction of the Euro.
13 Germany has devalued by 
more than 20% in real terms vis a vis Portugal, Spain, Ireland or Greece since 1999. It is in 
this context the recent crisis around Greek government bonds has to be seen.  
 
                                                
12 The fact that some countries recover quickly after a deep recession, does not imply that everything returns to 
pro-crisis. Onaran (2009) argues that financial crises often lead to lasting changes in functional income 
distribution. 
13 Presumably not all countries entered the Euro with the ‘correct’ exchange rate. In particular Deutsch Mark is 
often thought to have entered overvalued. However, if the real exchange rate realignments since 1999 were a 
correction of the initial values, one would expect the real exchange rates to stabilize after a while. As of now 
there is no indication for that. 18 
The flaw of the Euro system is basically the following: There is a common monetary policy 
and  fiscal  policy  is  severely  restricted.  Exchange  rate  realignments  are  by  definition  not 
available to adjust divergences across the Euro zone. So how can countries adjust? Basically 
through wage moderation. But this fails to work in practise. First, labour markets simply are 
not as flexible as economic textbooks and EU treaties would like them to be. Second, the 
adjustment via labour markets has a clear deflationary bias – the country with the current 
account deficit will have to adjust and it has to adjust by wage restraint and disinflation. 
However, as overall inflation is limited to two percent, any country that seriously wants to 
improve competitiveness would have to go through an extended period of deflation, which 
would require mass unemployment and falling wages. The present model requires that the 
deficit countries restrain inflation and growth whereas the surplus countries are allowed to 
proceed running surpluses. But beyond its failure to deliver stability, this arrangement also 
has  severe  distributional  consequences.  Simply  put,  under  the  present arrangement  Greek 
wages have fall, but German wages do not have to rise. The system puts a downward pressure 
on wages. 
 
Europe has reacted to the liberalization of capital flows by introducing a common currency. 
While this has ended the risk of exchange rate crises, trade and cost-related imbalances have 
bee  building  up  within  the  Euro  area  and  there  is  no  mechanism  for  resolving  these 
imbalances.  
 
5.4 The finance-dominated accumulation regime: fragile and low growth 
 
While there is evidence for a consumption boom in the USA (and previously for limited 
periods in some developing countries), for continental European countries one does not find 
the strong evidence of a consumption boom (related with a property price bubble)– despite the 
fact  that  household  debt  levels  increased  substantially.  However,  given  that  income 
distribution has changed at the expense of labour, which should have decreased consumption 
ratios, it is plausible that debt-driven consumption has also fuelled demand in Europe to some 
extent.
14  Investment  performance  has  been  weak.  In  particular  rising  profits  have  not 
translated  into  rising  investment.  Presumably  (but  hardly  conclusively)  this  is  related  to 
shareholder value orientation and increased uncertainty due to volatile financial markets. The 
liberalization of capital flows has relaxed current account constraints on countries and led to 
                                                
14 There is little evidence however, that this debt, much of which is mortgage debt, has caused a substantial 
increase in residential investment. The latter is falling as a share of overall investment. 19 
volatile exchange rates, which however, have not translated into a severe crises in Europe 
(with the exception of the 1992/93 EMS crisis) as they did in South East Asia, Latin America 
or Turkey. The Euro system has effectively prevented currency crises. However, the Euro 
came with a policy package, the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, that has 
fostered neoliberalization within Europe and led to a creeping divergence within Europe.  
 
Overall the effects of financialization thus give rise to a finance-dominated accumulation 
regime that is one of slow and fragile accumulation. There are two related reasons to expect 
the finance-dominated accumulation regime to come with more volatility in output growth 
(and other macroeconomic variables). First, macroeconomic shocks from the financial sector 
have become more severe and more frequent. There is ample evidence that financial markets 
generate highly volatile prices. Overshooting is well established for exchange rates and the 
boom  bust  cycles  of  share  prices  has  become  evident  (again)  in  the  past  years.  Second, 
because of high debt levels, the fragility of the economy has increased. Financialization has 
encouraged  households  to  take  on  more  debt.  This  debt  presumably  either  has  fuelled 
consumption expenditures  or was necessary to buy property in  the face  of soaring house 
prices. Either way, debt has to be serviced out of current income (or by ever increasing debt). 
Even temporary reductions in income may thus escalate if households have to default on their 
loans. While this need not happen necessarily, the fragility of the system has increased as the 
resilience of households against temporary shocks has decreased. 
 
One would expect that this combination of more frequent crises on financial markets and high 
fragility  of  households  to  translate  into  macro  economic  volatility.  IMF  (2007c)  presents 
evidence  that  business  cycle  have  become  more  moderate  since  the  1970s.  The  devil, 
however, lies in the detail. While “output volatility (…) has been significantly lower than 
during  the  1960s”  (IMF  2007c,  85),  recessions  have  become  harsher  in  the  Post-Bretton 
Woods era than in the Bretton Woods era (IMF 2002, Table 3.1). As output growth (and 
expansions) was much higher in the Fordist era than in the post-Fordist era, the IMF is correct 
in concluding that volatility has decreased. But this does not mean that recession have become 
less  severe!  Moreover,  financial  crises  have  become  more  frequent  and  more  severe 
(Eichengreen and Bordo 2003).
15 The present crisis is not a rare exception, but only one of 
many in the age deregulated finance. 
 
                                                
15 In particular Eichengreen and Bordo report that there had been no banking crises in the 1945-73 period. 20 
It is important to note that state shares in GDP are still substantially higher than at the time of 
Great Depression. Automatic stabilizers are thus in place and government consumption forms 
a sizable part of value added. Moreover, central banks in developed countries (in particular 
the Fed) have been pro-active in reacting to dangers of financial crisis. The resilience of a 
sizable government sector and (by historical standards) a functional welfare state combined 
with adept monetary policy may be the reason, why financial crises have so far not had a 
devastating effect on (advanced) economies (Stockhammer 2008). 
 
6. Income distribution and the underlying causes of the present crisis 
 
Two of the main characteristics of neoliberalism are the polarization of income distribution 
and the deregulation of the financial system. Both have interacted in complex ways to provide 
the  preconditions  of  the  present  crisis.  The  polarization  of  income  distribution  is  closely 
linked to the international imbalances that underlie the present crisis. The median working 
class  household  has  experienced  stagnant  wages  in  most  developed  countries.  Certainly 
consumption norms (as spread through mass media) have increased faster than median wages. 
Combined with a weak investment performance this has led to shortfall of private demand. 
Effectively (but not necessarily by intention) two different strategies have emerged: In Anglo-
Saxon  countries  the  shortfall  of  disposable  income  has  been  compensated  by  credit  and 
increasing debt levels. The property boom allowed households to take out loans that they 
could not afford given their income, but that seemed reasonable to banks which assumed that 
property  prices  would  continue  to  increase.  These  countries  developed  a  credit-financed 
consumption boom that came with current account deficits. The resulting capital inflows again 
fuelled the property bubble and bubbles in other financial markets.  
 
In the second group of countries median working-class households faced a similar stagnation 
in  wages.  In  these  countries  private  consumption  expenditures  remained  weak.  Here  net 
exports played the key component of demand growth. Thus these countries developed an 
export-led growth model.  
 
The same phenomenon, stagnation in real wages, had different effects in different countries. 
Moreover, the two growth models rely on each other: the credit-driven consumption model 
implies  current  account  deficits  and  thus  will  only  work,  if  there  are  surplus  countries. 
Inversely, the export-growth strategy will only work, if there are deficit countries that absorb 21 
their exports. The current account imbalances were made possible by financial globalization 
and the liberalization of capital flows.  
 
The roots of the crisis are thus only in part to be found in the financial sector. Given the 
severity of the economic crisis it is tempting to infer that it must have profound structural 
roots. Out analysis suggests that this is indeed the case. All building blocks of neoliberalism - 
financialization, rising inequality and globalization – are implicated in giving rise to creating 
the imbalances that have erupted in the present crisis. In this sense it is very much a crisis of 
neoliberalism. 
 
This diagnosis is not to be confused with forecasting the imminent demise of neoliberalism., 
even if the stocks of free market ideology have suffered from some time to come. The Marxist 
as well as the Foucault’ian interpretation indicate that neoliberalism is about power relations 
(or  govermentality)  rather  than  about  free  markets.  Looking  at  the  policy  debates  in  the 
aftermath of the crisis, the absence of a serious attempt to regulate finance, to reluctance of 
governments to use nationalized banks for industrial policy, the persistent taboo of increasing 
taxation of the super-rich that neoliberalism has created and the severe cuts in public services 
that look likely to follow the fiscal crisis can only conclude that in a political sense this not a 




The paper has argued that the causes of the present crisis are deeply rooted in neoliberalism. 
The polarization of income distribution and the deregulation of finance have interacted to 
create macroeconomic imbalances and bubbles. Highlighting the role of wage moderation in 
this process also lends itself to policy conclusions: As wage moderation has been one of the 
structural  causes  underlying  the  present  crisis,  one  condition  for  re-establishing  a  viable 
growth regime, is a change in wage policy. Wages have to increase at least with productivity 
growth. This would stabilize domestic demand in the surplus countries and allow to avoid a 
collapse  of  consumption  demand  in  the  deficit  countries.  A  more  egalitarian  income 
distribution is not luxury that can be dealt with once the economy has been stabilized, it is an 
integral part of a sound macroeconomic structure.  
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Figure 2.1 Income share of the top 1% in English-speaking countries  
 
 




Source:  Atkinson,  Piketty  and  Saez  (2010),  Figures  7A  and  7B26 
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Figure 5. Standard deviation of the current account as % of GDP across OECD countries 
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